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SYMPOSIUM
FOREWORD:
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY-TOWARDS A
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
F. Jay Dougherty*
I. INTRODUCTION
The initial impetus for this symposium was to inform U.S. attorneys of
the existence or non-existence of a right to control the commercial exploita-
tion of one's name or likeness under foreign laws in view of the scarcity of
information in English regarding the right of publicity. Comparative law
perspectives are "needed now more than ever because of the expansion of
international transactions; the globalization of legal culture; and the move-
ments for unification, federation, and law reform around the world."' The
"merchandising" of U.S. celebrities is a huge international business.2 Many
advertisements are internationally distributed. The internet is the ultimate
borderless medium, incorporating both content and advertising. Because of
personal jurisdiction and choice of law issues,' it may be necessary to pur-
sue claims in foreign courts. 4 As a result, U.S. attorneys will greatly benefit
from a knowledge of comparative right of publicity laws.
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School of Los Angeles. The author would
like to thank Professor Edith Friedler and Professor Lawrence Helfer for their helpful suggestions
in connection with this ariticle, and the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertain-
ment Law Journal for thier tireless work in preparing this Foreword and the other contributions to
the Symposium. Of course, any opinions, expressed or implied, or any errors made in this article
are the responsibility of the author.
1. P. John Kozyris, Comparative Law for the Twenty-First Century: New Horizons and New
Technologies, 69 TuL. L. REv. 165, 178 (1994).
2. See Benjamin Barber, The Saturday Essay: Disneyfication that Impoverishes Us All,
INDEP., Aug. 29, 1998, at 7; Roberto Muller, Play Ball: Could You Be Contender in the Global
Sports Market?, MINORITY Bus. ENTREPRENEUR, Oct. 31, 1997, at 64; Keith Damsell, Glitz
Alone Fails to Keep Planet HollywoodAloft, FN. POST, Feb. 12, 1997, at 23.
3. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
4. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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With the increasing incorporation of intellectual property into the do-
main of world trade, a true "international law" concerning the right of pub-
licity is likely.5 If there is going to be a "harmonization" of this right, schol-
ars and legislators should have an understanding of what is to be
harmonized.6
There are two overarching issues in this Foreword and the articles it in-
troduces. First, many important right of publicity issues, including choice of
law, assignability, inheritability, etc., turn on the characterization of the
right as either privacy-based or property-based. Sometimes opposite results
occur due to these opposing characterizations. Second, this forward will
explore the extent to which the disjointed American right of publicity has af-
fected, as well as whether it should affect, the right of publicity jurispru-
dence in other countries.
This Foreword discusses the right of publicity and conflict of laws in
the U.S., briefly summarizes the right of publicity and conflict of laws in
other countries placing the Articles which follow in a global perspective, and
provides an overview of the current policy debate concerning right of pub-
licity. This commentary suggests, by reference to copyright law, that al-
though there may be benefits to an international proprietary right of public-
5. The basis for a true international law concerning right of publicity is illustrated in several
international treaties and instruments providing for recognition of a right to privacy, such as Article
12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, Article 5 of the American Declaration on Human Rights and Duties of Man, and Articles
16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See, e.g., Elisabeth Logeais,
The French Right of Image: An Ambiguous Concept Protecting the Human Persona, 18 Loy.
L.A. ENT. L.J. 511, 513-15 (1998). These provisions have been a source of support for develop-
ment of the law in many countries. See id.; Guillermo Cabanellas, The Right of Publicity Under
Argentine Law, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 449, 452-53 (1998). The importance of limits on these
rights is also reflected in these treaties' provision for freedom of expression. See Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, Art. 19; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 19; Art.
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights; Art. IV of the American Declaration of Human
Rights and Duties of Man; see, e.g., Logeais, supra note 5, at n. 104 and accompanying text; cf
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51
VAND. L. REV. 217, 296-307 (1998) (discussing international free speech law as it may be impli-
cated in the expansion of copyright globally).
6. In addition to the articles and materials cited elsewhere in this Foreword, the following are
additional resources in English regarding the right of publicity and similar rights in other countries:
Julius C.S. Pinckaers, The Right of Persona: A New Intellectual Property Right for the US and
EU, 68 COPYRIGHT WORLD 26 (1997); Silvio Martuccelli, An Up-and-coming Right-The Right
of Publicity: Its Birth in Italy and its Consideration in the United States, 4 ENT. L. REv. 109
(1993); Elisabeth Logeais, The French Right to One's Image: A Legal Lure?, 5 ENT. L. REV. 163
(1994); Jukka V. Muhonen, Right of Publicity in Finland, 3 ENT. L. REv. 103 (1997); B. St. Mi-
chael Hylton and Peter Goldson, The New Tort of Appropriation of Personality: Protecting Bob
Marley's Face, 55 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 56 (1996) (discussing the development of the tort of appro-
priation of personality in Jamaica); Frits Oppenoorth, Facets of Dutch Portrait Law, 28
COPYRIGHT WORLD 38 (1993).
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ity, one should be cautious of advocating "transplantation" of the U.S. right
into other countries.
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN THE U.S.
The right of publicity, the recognition of a property right in the com-
mercial use of a person's indicia of identity7, appears to be an invention of
U.S. judges and lawmakers.' Initially based on a perceived "natural right"
of privacy9 and nurtured by judicial concern for deterring unfair competition
through consumer deception, 0 the recognition of the right of publicity as
"property" is usually attributed'" to Haelen Laboratories v. Topps Chewing
Gum. 12 The Haelen decision posited that the right should be recognized as
something different from those sources (as it turns out mistakenly interpret-
ing New York law)' 3 and should be treated as "property"-exclusive, as-
signable, and descendible. 14
The right of publicity is a matter of state law in the United States.
Although a proprietary right of publicity seems well-established in the U.S.,
it is not necessarily uniformly recognized. There is no federal right of pub-
licity, and determining how many states recognize the right is complicated
by several factors. First, some states protect the commercial right, but un-
der a rubric of invasion of privacy.'5 Second, many states have not directly
addressed the question. 6 Third, many of the courts that have addressed the
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
8. See generally, Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 Ind. L.J. 1 (1997). "Lawmakers" re-
fers to courts and legislatures. See, e.g., Pavesivich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 191
(1904); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 71 N.Y.S. 876 (1901); N.Y. CIv. RTS. LAW §§
50-51 (1998).
9. See generally, Pavesevich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 191 (1904) (justifying
recognition of a right of privacy by analogy to a human being's natural right to control one's
body).
10. See generally J. THOMAs MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, §§
5.2-5.4 (1995); see, e.g., Allen v. National Video Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (using a
Woody Allen look-a-like in advertisement violates Lanham Act § 43(a)); Estate of Elvis Presley v.
Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (impersonating Elvis Presley violated right of publicity,
infringed upon trademarks, and constituted unfair competition).
11. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 1.7; Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19
LAW& CONST. PROBLEMS 203, 204 (1954).
12. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). Trading cards still provide a source of much case law in
connection with the right of publicity. See, e.g., Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443
(11 th Cir. 1998); Block v. Major League Baseball, 65 Cal. App. 4th 538 (1998); Barnett v. Topps
Co., 1998 WL 257859 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
13. See Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174 (1984).
14. See Haelen Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
15. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 6.1.
16. Id.
1998]
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question are federal courts surmising what they believe to be the applicable
state law, and in some cases, the applicable state's courts later rejected the
right of publicity. 7 Professor McCarthy, author of the major treatise on
rights of publicity,'8 finds that as of June, 1997, twenty-five states recognize
the right either by statute or in common law, 19 and only fourteen of those
states provide for a post-mortem right20 The U.S. may be "the leading pro-
ponent of publicity rights,",2' but the process of recognizing the right contin-
ues to involve debate as to the proper subject matter and scope of the right.
22
III. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY-AN "AMERICAN" RIGHT?
One recent U.S. article justifies the right of publicity by referring to
our cultural fabric and history and our legal conceptions of property.23
While finding the roots of a legal right in the history, sociology, and culture
of a society is fascinating as a hypothetical explanation,24 this approach
seems less useful when viewed as justification for that right. Cultural
analysis may explain the differences between the California approach and
the French approach, but can it explain the differences between the treatment
in Georgia (the first state to recognize commercial appropriation privacy at
common law) and South Carolina (which has not yet addressed the ques-
tion)? However, the position of current U.S. law instead results from the
existence of interest group power in a particular state (California has many
successful celebrity citizens) and the happenstance of the location of risk-
17. Id.
18. See McCARTHY, supra note 10, at 1; see also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 46, supra note 7, Reporter's Note (describing McCarthy's as the "leading trea-
tise").
19. See MCCARTHY, supranote 10, § 6.1[B].
20. Assignability and descendibility are two "property" characteristics that seem to differen-
tiate a "right of publicity" from a "right of privacy."
21. Kwall, supra note 8, at 15.
22. See generally Stephen R. Barnett, The Right of Publicity Versus Free Spech in Advertis-
ing: Some Counter Points to Professor McCarthy, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 593 (1996);
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81
CAL. L. REv. 127 (1993).
23. See id.
24. It has been said:
[Y]ou cannot truly pursue the comparative method through the study of formal legal
texts alone. It is necessary to get to know what is behind the texts and also, even
more important, how they function. This requires understanding the legal culture
that produced the laws, and more broadly, the social and economic structures and
the ethical and political values that support them. Laws cannot be grasped in an
idealized form outside the context of the society that created them.
Kozyris, supra note 1, at 168.
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taking potential defendants and proactive plaintiffs,25 in addition to cultural
factors.26
Furthermore, suggesting that the U.S. "stands in the forefront among
nations" or that it "is a leader among nations in protecting publicity rights"
may be understood to imply that other nations should follow our "lead. ,
27
But, "[b]efore a legal model can be transplanted, the conditions in the two
societies-the one from which it comes and the one to which it goes-must
be taken into account.' 28 The right of privacy, from which the right of pub-
licity was born, has been described a "uniquely American,, 29 but other na-
tions recognize rights protecting similar interests, and their roots may pre-
cede those of the U.S. right. For example, the French courts recognized the
right of privacy as early as the Rachel case in 1858.30 Moreover, the right
of privacy developed vigorously in France as it was less proscribed by free-
dom of speech and the press. 3' German law recognized a "portrait right"
32
as early as 1907,33 commercial exploitation as a violittion of personal rights
in the "Graf Zeppelin" case in 1910, and protection of commercial interests
25. See generally Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., Co., 122 Ga. 191 (1904).
26. Cultural studies provide a stimulating and provocative description behind the develop-
ment of the law. The collapse of monarchy and the growth of democracy did not give birth to fame,
but made it available to everyone. See LEO BRAUDY, THE FRENZY OF RENOWN: FAME & ITS
HISTORY 18 (Oxford University Press 1986). Is propertizing fame an instinctive attempt to make it
impervious to the audience? Does it take celebrity back from the general public and create a new
elite, resembling monarchy? There are intriguing areas for further research and thought.
27. The U.S. is probably a "net exporter" of celebrity. See Symposium, Identity Crisis: A
Vision for the Right of Publicity in the Year 2020, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 33 (1995).
28. Kosyris, supra note 1, at 169.
29. McCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 1.2.
30. See Logeais, supra note 6, at 164.
31. See generally Jeanne M. Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren &
Brandeis Tort is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris, 68 TuL. L. REv. 1219 (1994)
(describing the origins and nature of the right of privacy in France).
32. This term generally refers to the right, found usually in a nation's copyright law, of the
subject of a portrait to prohibit the making or exploitation of the portrait. See Frits Oppenorth,
Facets of Dutch Portrait Law, 28 COPYRIGHT WORLD 38, 38-39 (1993). While there is no such
provision in U.S. copyright law, the owner of copyright in a photograph of an identifiable human
subject does not have the right to use that likeness in advertising or on products, because to do so
would violate the subject's rights of publicity (and possibly, privacy). See, e.g., Michaels v. Inter-
net Entertainment Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that a publicity claim
regarding mere reproduction of video is preempted by Federal copyright law, but not regarding use
of names and likenesses in advertising); Ainsworth v. Century Supply Co., 295 Ill. App.3d 644
(1998) (using an authorized video in an ad may exceed consent and violate a right of publicity).
Such a use might also constitute unfair competition, if the use would be likely to cause confusion
as to source, sponsorship or approval. See Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 233
(1908), affTd sub nom, Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes, 220 U.S. 502 (1911); McCARTHY,
supra note 10, § 11.14[B].
33. See KUG § 22 (German law of artistic creations); MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 6.25[A].
1998]
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in the Paul Dahlke case in 1956.34 Recognition of the interests protected by
the right of publicity may in some countries be influenced by U.S. case law,
legislation, and commentary, but to conclude that the U.S. leads and others
follow may be mistaken. Such a conclusion may inadvertently imply that
the U.S. approach to this legal problem is the best one for other societies.
IV. CONFLICTS OF LAW AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Choice of law jurisprudence generally has been described as "confused
and conflicting"3 5 and "in considerable disarray., 36  In the U.S., various
methods used by the several states to determine choice of law in approaching
a multistate exploitation of publicity rights has been called "inherently arbi-
trary., 37 Some advocates cite a need for a uniform federal right of publicity
38statute. In an international context, there are very few right of publicity
cases discussing choice of law. U.S. reported cases mainly concern the ex-
ploitation in the U. S. of the persona of an individual (or musical group)
domiciled in another country.39 In those cases the courts applied either the
law of the state where the infringement occured, or the law of the state where
the licensee was domiciled.40
A. Choice Of Law Theories
The U.S. applies various choice of law theories to cases which in-
clude:41 (1) the "Vested Rights Theory; 'A2 (2) the "Most Significant Rela-
tionship" approach;43 (3) "Governmental Interest Analysis; '"" (4) Professor
34. Christof Kruger, Right of Privacy, Right of Pesonality and Commercial Advertising, 13
ILC 183, 184 (1982); see also W. Van Caenegem, Different Approaches to the Protection of Ce-
lebrities against Unauthorized Use of their Image in Advertising in Australia, the United States
and the Federal Republic ofGemany, 12 EIPR 452 (1990).
35. Richard Cameron Cray, Comment, Choice of Law in Right of Publicity, 31 UCLA L.
REv. 640, 651 (1984).
36. W, RICHMAN & W. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 70a (1984).
37. Cray, supra note 35, at 641.
38. See, e.g., J. Eugene Salomon, Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a
Federal Statute, 60 So. CAL. L. REv. 1179 (1987); Cray, supra note 35, at 641.
39. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
40. See id
41. See Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992) (adopting the "most significant
relationship" approach to tort actions, and discussing the various other approaches and states
which follow each).
42. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, §§ 51-56.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 153 (1971); see RICHMAN &
REYNOLDS, supra note 39, § 60. This approach looks first to whether there is a determinative
statutory choice of law rule. If there is no such statutory rule, it sets forth presumptive rules for
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Leflar's "Choice Influencing Considerations" approach;45 (5) the law of the
forum state ("lexfori"); and (6) some combination of theories.
46
Each of these theories has its advantages and disadvantages when ap-
plied to interstate or international right of publicity claims. The Vested
Rights Theory, applied in approximately one-third of the states,47 seems
particularly ill-suited to the right of publicity because it has characteristics
of both property and tort, and because it may implicate contractual trans-
fers.48  This approach also fails to expressly consider the real underlying
policy interests at stake regarding right of publicity claims, although judicial
"escape devices" have been used to avoid results judges felt would be un-
fair.49 The Most Significant Relationship approach, 50 used by almost half
the states, permits a court to expressly consider policy," but it is criticized
different issues and types of claims, but ultimately looks to the law of the state of the most signifi-
cant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, determined by application of a set of general
principles set forth in § 6. Included among those principles is consideration of underlying policies.
44. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11.3[D][3][b]. In this approach, the court looks care-
fully at the policies of the forum and those of any other interested states. If only one state's poli-
cies are implicated in the actual dispute, there is a "false conflict," and the interested state's law
applies. If more than one state's policies would be furthered, there is a "true conflict." In that
event, the court should examine the issue more carefully to try to avoid the conflict, but, if that
cannot be achieved, the court should apply the forum law. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra
note 32, § 63. Strictly speaking, this approach does not involve the balancing of competing poli-
cies, although variations of this approach, such as the "comparative impairment" approach used in
California, do attempt to weigh competing policy interests. Id. § 64.
45. Under this approach, courts apply five "considerations:" predictability of result, mainte-
nance of interstate and international order, simplification of the judicial task, advancement of the
forum's interests, and the better rule of law. The last consideration reflects the observation that
judges consider "socio-economic jurisprudential standards" to achieve what they consider a just
result in the particular case. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 32, § 66; Robert A. Leflar,
Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1966). Id.
46. See Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tenn. 1992).
47. MCCARTHY supra note 10, at § 11.3 [A].
48. Id.; Cray, supra note 35, at 655; see Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443,
1445 (11 th Cir. 1998) (examining Alabama law).
49. See RIcHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 32, at 153-54.
50. The Restatement Second Conflict of Laws contains rules for addressing commercial ap-
propriation privacy, although not expressly pertaining to the right of publicity. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 152 ("Right to Privacy") § 153 ("Multistate Invasion of Pri-
vacy"). In a multistate invasion of privacy, § 153 would follow a single publication rule, applying
the local law of the state that has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties
under the general principles in § 6. Section 153 states that that state most often will be the plain-
tiffs domicile, if the offending material was published in that state. Id § 153. Section 10 indi-
cates that these rules would generally apply to a case with elements in several foreign nations as
well, although noting that there may be factors in such a case which would lead to a different result
that if the case had been an interstate matter. Among such factors would be differences in politi-
cal, social and legal institutions, and concerns arising from the lack of Constitutional safeguards.
Id § 10, comment d.
51. See Hataway, 830 S.W.2d at 57-58.
19981
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for its complexity. In permitting almost anything to be considered, this ap-
proach is difficult to predict.52 The Governmental Interests approach has
similar difficulties to the Most Significant Relationship approach. The Gov-
ernmental Interests approach fails to provide a basis for choice where more
than one state has a strong interest, and it permits a court to favor the forum
state law.53 The Choice Influencing Considerations approach likewise
permits forum favoritism.-4 The lexfori approach has predictability, but it
is inherently arbitrary in the context of multiple-state infringements and it
permits forum-shopping." A commentator has recommended a state of
"greatest infringement" approach,56  which has been criticized as
"unpredictable in a multistate infringement case."57 Ultimately, as Professor
McCarthy noted, which choice of law rule is best will depend on "whose ox
is being gored."58
There are at least two relevant types of cases where the law of the
domicile of the plaintiff seems to be applied. First, as to the right of pri-
vacy, whether a state applies a Vested Rights approach (which would look
to the place where the injury occurs) or a Most Significant Relationship ap-
proach, the law of domicile of the plaintiff would be the usual rule, assum-
ing that the offending material was exploited in that state.59 Second, al-
though there are no reported cases dealing with the issue as to a non-U.S.
celebrity,6° there is case law to support the proposition that the applicable
law as to descendibility of the right of publicity should be the law of the
state where the celebrity was domiciled at the time of death.6' Following this
52. McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11.3[A)
53. See Hataway, 830 S.W.2d at 58.
54. See RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, § 66[b].
55. McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11.3[D][2].
56. Cray, supra note 35, at 662.
57. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11.3[D][2].
58. Id. § 11.3[E]
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, 153; see MCCARTHY, supra note 10,
§11.3[B].
60. As this Foreword was going to press, an Order was issued in the case of Cairns v.
Franklin Mint Company. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., No. CV 98-3847 RAP (C.D. Cal. filed Oct.
16, 1998). Among other things, the court dismissed a right of publicity claim by the executors of
the Estate of Diana, Princess of Wales, against a company producing and advertising various mer-
chandise depicting Princess Diana. Id. at 6. The claim was dismissed based on the analysis that
Cal.Civ.Code § 3344 and California choice of law rules dictate that the law of domicile at time of
death determines whether the decedent's right of publicity survives death. Id. at 8-22. Because
Princess Diana was domiciled in England, which does not recognize a right of publicity, no such
right descended to her estate. Id. The author wishes to thank Doug Mirell, Esq. of Loeb & Loeb
for providing a copy of the Order.
61. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., No. CV 98-3847 RAP (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 16, 1998); see
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981); Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day
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approach, a U.S court (particularly in the Second Circuit) would deny a
claim by heirs of Princess Diana against a defendant who exploited her like-
ness on merchandise, because she was domiciled in the U.K. at the time of
her death, and the U.K. does not presently recognize a right of publicity.
6 2
There are very few reported cases dealing with the appropriation of
persona of a foreign person in the U.S. In Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Mas-
ter, 63 the plaintiffs, a company licensed to use the likenesses of English art-
ists, claimed trademark infringement, unfair competition, and a right of pub-
licity violation against defendant's unauthorized manufacturing/distribution
of buttons and similar items. 64 The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that a New York state court would apply a
"property" rule to a right of publicity claim, which would look to the "situs"
of the property. In the case where the artists resided in the U.K., the "situs"
of the property would be the state of domicile of the exclusive merchandising
agent. The English artists did not have a claim under the law of their
domicile, England, but they did have a claim under the law of Georgia, the
state of incorporation of their exclusive representative. There is a level of
unreality to determining the "situs" of such intangible property. If it is situ-
ated anywhere, one would think it would be the domicile of the persons
whose personality was exploited. The same outcome could have been
reached in this case by applying the law of the place where the exploitation
took place. To the extent that this rule is applied in the future, it demon-
strates the potential for manipulating outcomes by incorporating a mer-
chandising agent in a state with strong rights of publicity.
Bi-Rite Enters. v. Bruce Miner Co. 65 applied the Most Significant Re-
lationship analysis in a similar situation, and reached the same result as Bi-
Rite Enters. v. Button Master Co.66 Bruce Minor involved unauthorized
posters of popular musical artists.61 The sole issue on appeal was whether
& Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Acme Circus Operating Co., v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d
1538 (1lth Cir. 1983); MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11.3[D][3][a]. In Acme Circus, the 11th
Circuit attempted to determine what rule California state courts would apply to this issue. The
court concluded that California courts would apply California Civil Code § 946 to find the law of
domicile applicable, and it did not have to determine whether the same result would obtain under
California's governmental interests analysis. Acme, 711 F.2d, at 1540-41.
62. See, e.g., Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
63. 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Button Master was a suit by a manufac-
turer/distributor of buttons, posters and other novelty items bearing the marks of various musical
artists and groups. Id. at 1191. Since the artists were "public figures" and could demonstrate no
harm to their feelings, their privacy actions were denied. Id. at 1198. Summary judgement was
granted to most of the artists, however, on the right of publicity claims. Id. at 1201.
64. Id. at 1191.
65. 757 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1985).
66. 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
67. Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 441.
19981
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the court should apply the law of the artists' domicile or the law of the resi-
dence of the artist's exclusive licensee and merchandising representative
(Connecticut, Illinois and Georgia, all of which recognize a right of public-
ity).68 All the artists in this case resided in England, but the court, applying
Massachusetts' Most Significant Relationship analysis, decided that "[t]he
law of the United States governs.'69
The court considered the factors set forth in section 6 of the Restate-
ment Second Conflicts of Laws. 70 First, the court looked at the "needs of the
interstate and international system." 7' Because of the "[plervasive and much
prized" trade between Great Britain and the U.S. in the popular music indus-
try which the court determined would be nurtured by giving "[t]he same
commercial rights to foreigners as nationals"72 this court favored applying
U.S. substantive law.
Second, the court looked at the "relevant policies of the forum," and
compared it to the laws of Illinois, Connecticut, Georgia, and England.7
The court determined that the states policies are to prevent unjust enrichment
and provide economic incentive to invest in a "[plerformance of interest to
the public."74 Britain's policy was assumed to be "[a] policy choice favor-
ing unrestricted competition in the area of commercial exploitation of names
and likenesses., 75 However, the court found that Britain's interest and its
public would not be harmed by allowing performers to restrict exploitation
of their names and likenesses in the U.S.
76
Third, the court looked at the protection of expectations. The court
stated that the copyrights of the photographs from which the posters were
made were licensed to the defendant. The court went on to state the defen-
dant's contention that the photographers who took the publicity photos at
"unrestricted photosessions" expected to have a broad range of rights. 77
However, the court rejected defendant's broad argument and its assumption
that as a result of "unrestricted photosessions," performers expected to con-
vey U.S. publicity rights.78
68. Id. at 442.
69. Id. at 446.
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
71. Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 441.
72. Id. at 444.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)). See discussion
of these policies infra, at 119-20.
75. Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 445.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 446.
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Finally, the court found that "certainty, predictability, and uniformity"
would be served by applying U.S. state law. 79  The court concluded that
Georgia's law, the state of incorporation of the exclusive merchandising rep-
resentative, would apply to the claims of the individual artists, presumably
because this was the situs of the "property."80 Based on the foregoing, the
court affirmed the grant of preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs."
But certainty and predictability could be better served by a simpler
rule, such as applying the law of the state where the infringing acts took
place. The Bruce Miner court could have reached the same outcome on that
basis.
In Nice Man Merchandising v. Logocraft,82 a case by a Minnesota
corporation against a U.K. company with offices in Pennsylvania, the court
purported to follow Bruce Miner's analysis. However, it applied the law of
the forum and where the infringement occurred, rather than that of the
domicile of the plaintiff licensee. 3
These cases leave great uncertainty as to what law a U.S. court will
apply. It does seem clear, however, that where (i) there is a licensee domi-
ciled in a state which recognizes the right, (ii) the forum recognizes the right,
79. Id.
80. Id.; see McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11.3[D][1].
81. Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 446; accord, Nice Man Merchandising, Inc. v. Logocroft
Ltd., No.CIV.A..91-7475, 1992 WL 59133, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 1992) (applying Pennsylva-
nia conflict of laws rules, which permits an analysis of the policies and interests underlying a par-
ticular issue); Apple Corps. v. Button Master, P.C.P., Inc., No.CIV.A.96-5470, 1998 WL 126935,
at * 1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 1998) (allowing summary judgment for plaintiff exclusive licensee against
unauthorized manufacturer/distributor of buttons featuring name, likeness. and registered trade-
marks of The Beatles). Note that the items sold by the defendant in both Bi-Rite Enters., and Lo-
gocrafl were not "bootlegs" manufactured by the defendant, but apparently purchased abroad
where they may not have been unlawful. There is very little case law as whether a "first sale doc-
trine" applies in right of publicity actions, so that items sold with the consent of the person de-
picted could be resold without liability. The Eleventh Circuit recently held that it does. Allison v.
Vintage Sprots Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1998). The first sale doctrine applies in con-
nection with copyrights, patents and trademarks. Id. at 1448. The Bi-Rile Enters. opinion effec-
tively rejects the first sale doctrine under its facts. See Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d, at 445-46. Nice
Man enjoined the sale of unused but presumably authorized European promotional posters includ-
ing names and likenesses of musical artists in the U.S., as a violation of the artists' rights of pub-
licity and Lanham Act § 43(a), without addressing the first sale issue. Nice Man, 1992 WL
59133, at *6.
82. No. CIVA. 91-7475, 1992 WL 59133, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 1992)
83. Id. at *4-5. The plaintiff was a Minnesota corporation. Neither Minnesota nor Pennsyl-
vania have a right of publicity statute, but there are federal court cases in each state predicting that
the state courts would recognize a right of publicity. The court did not indicate which state's law it
was applying, but cited one Eastern District of Pennsylvania case, and no Minnesota (or federal
courts situated in Minnesota) cases, so it appears they applied Pennsylvania law. Id at *5. The
court was also unclear as to what extent it granted relief under Lanham Act § 43(a) or under the
right of publicity. Id. at *5-6.
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and (iii) exploitation occurred in the forum state, a U.S. court will accord
rights of publicity-even to a plaintiff domiciled in a country that does not
recognize the right of publicity.
Even where the licensee is not domiciled in a state that recognizes the
right the Restatement Second of Conflicts of Law approach (and the other
interest balancing approaches) could support applicability of the law of the
place of infringement or even of the forum state to find a violation of the
right.84 Of course, those states that apply a lex forum approach would also
find liability in such circumstances. Similarly, a state that does not recog-
nize the right of publicity could, under each of these approaches, refuse to
enforce another state's right of publicity.85
It is submitted that, perhaps, international right of publicity actions
should be treated like international copyright claims, where courts apply the
law of the "protecting country," i.e., the country where the infringing act
took place.86 One potential objection is that this copyright-type rule could
lead to a multiplicity of actions.87 However, the rule has proved to be rela-
tively workable and predictable.
84. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11.3[E].
85. Id. § 11.3[B].
86. There is some ambiguity whether the law of "the country where protection is claimed,"
which is the applicable law pursuant to Art. 5(2) of the Berne Convention, refers to the law of the
forum, or the law of the country where the infringing acts took place. See The Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971), Art. 5(2) [hereinafter Berne
Convention]; EUGEN ULMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 10-
11 (Kluwer 1978) (suggesting it is most likely to mean the latter); see also, Paul Edward Geller,
Conflicts of Law in Cyberspace: Rethinking International Copyright, 44 J. OF THE COPYRIGHT
Soc'y 103, 106 (1996).
Note, a rule mandating that courts apply the law of the protecting country could be subject
to a limitation that no greater rights be accorded than those recognized under the law of the domi-
cile of the person whose persona was used. This proposed exception, which seems analogous to
the "rule ofthe shorter term" permitted under the Berne Convention, would function to assure that
important limitations on the right, particularly those protecting freedom of expression, could not be
avoided. Berne Covnention at Art. 7(8). Without such an exception, expressive works which are
distributed multinationally would have to comply with the law least protective of speech in order to
avoid potential liability in a foreign forum. The exception is fair because the plaintiff should not
reasonably expect greater protection in a foreign forum than she would receive in her domestic fo-
rum. Moreover, if plaintiffs believe their domicile forum rule is overly permissive, they are in a
position to influence domestic legislation to modify the rule.
87. This potential problem has been recently discussed in the context of uses of copyright in
cyberspace. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Global Use/Territorial Rights: Private International Law
Questions of the Global Information Infrastructure, 42 J. OF THE COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 318 (1995)
(suggesting a Restatement Second Conflict of Laws type approach to multinational copyright in-
fringement claims); Geller, supra note 86, at 106 (suggesting "localizing" infringing acts in the
country where the remedy for the act takes effect).
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B. Personal Jurisdiction
Although personal jurisdiction was not a disputed issue in the above
cases, it can be a determinative problem in international right of publicity
cases. In the recent case Noonan v. Winston Company,8 claims for right of
publicity under Massachusetts law against a British publisher, a French ad-
vertising agency, and French cigarette company were dismissed for lack of
sufficient minimum contacts. An unauthorized photo of the plaintiff, a
Boston policeman who strongly opposed smoking, was taken by an em-
ployee of the British publisher. It was licensed to the French advertising
agency, which used the photo in an advertisement for Winston cigarettes.
Sufficient contacts for due process purposes requires "purposeful availment
of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state." This require-
ment was not met for the advertising agency and RJR France. As to the
British publisher, which solicited business in Massachusetts, there was ju-
risdiction under the Massachusetts long-arm statute, but the contacts were
not sufficiently "continuous and systematic" to constitute minimum contacts
required under the Constitution.
The plaintiff in Noonan might have had a claim under French law, and
jurisdiction could be obtained in France. This case is an example of the im-
portance for U.S. attorneys to be familiar with other countries' protection of
similar interests.
V. OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND CONFLICTS OF LAW
UNDER NON-U.S. LAW
As sparse as U.S. law is with regard to right of publicity claims by
foreign nationals, there is even less applicable law in this area in other
countries. International conflicts of law in connection with right of publicity
(and analogous rights) is at least as uncertain as U.S. law.8 9
A. United Kingdom
The right of publicity is not recognized in the U.K.9 Unfair competi-
tion law in the form of "passing off' is a possible cause of action but is
88. 135 F.3d 85 (lst Cir. 1998).
89. See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WEsTERN EUROPE; A GUIDE
THROUGH THE JUNGLE, 37 (Transnational Publishers, 1995).
90. Hayley Stallard, The Right of Publicity in the United Kingdom, 18 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J.
565, 565 (1998); see also, Catherine Louise Buchanan, A Comparative Analysis of Name and
Likeness Rights in the United States and England, 18 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 301 (1988).
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traditionally limited in its application. In one well-known English case,
Lyngstad v. Anabas Prods. Ltd.,91 the Swedish band Abba filed a passing-
off claim against an unauthorized distributor of merchandise featuring the
name and likeness of the band. The U.K. court applied U.K. law to the
claim without discussing conflict of law issues. 92 Abba's request for a pre-
liminary injunction was denied because the group didn't sell competing mer-
chandise and, therefore, under the restrictive U.K. view, there could be no
"passing off." 93 It would appear that other countries which use an unfair
competition approach, such as Australia, would also apply their local law to
the claim. 94 Because unfair competition claims are tort claims, local law is
applied to such a claim consistent with the concept that courts apply the law
of the place where the wrongdoing occurred.
If the Noonan case had been brought against the U.K. publisher in the
U.K., there would have been personal jurisdiction, but, because the U.K.
does not recognize a right of privacy or publicity and "passing off" does not
appear to be involved, it seems unlikely that a claim would be successful.
Query whether a U.K. court would permit a claim for invasion of privacy,
applying Massachusetts law, on the argument that the applicable choice of
law should be the domicile of the plaintiff.95
A Human Rights Bill that would incorporate the European Convention
on Human Rights directly into British law is pending in Parliament. 96 That
Convention provides, among other things that "[e]veryone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 97
It also provides for a balancing of freedom of expression against the right of
privacy.98 While the introduction of a legal right to privacy in England is
highly controversial, this bill would seem to indicate a move in that direc-
tion.
91. 3 F.S.R. 62 (1977).
92. Id. at 66-68.
93. Id. at 69.
94. See John McMullan, Personality Rights in Australia, 8 AusTL. INTELL. PROP. J. 86, 86-
87(1997).
95. This seems unlikely under U.K. choice of law analysis. See Robert G. Howell, Intellec-
tual Property, Private International Law, and Issues of Territoriality, 13 CAN. INTELL. PROP.
REv. 209, 212-13 (1997).
96. See Human Rights Bill, as approved by the House of Lords, 577 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th
Ser.) 1726 (1997), introduced into the House of Commons, Geb. 6, 1998, 663 PARL. DEB., H.L.
(5th ser.) 31 (1998), available in United Kingdom Parliament (visited Apr. 10, 1998)
<http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmbills/119/1998119.htm> (on
file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
97. Id. art. 8, § 1.
98. Id. art. 8, § 2.
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B. France
The French law for violation of the "right of image" is derived from the
general tort action under Article 1382 of the French Civil Code.99 The ap-
proach to appropriation of persona disputes in France has its roots in the
right of privacy, but there is ongoing controversy as to whether it is solely a
personal right or also a.property right) °° Even though the U.S. Restatement
Second Conflict of Laws would generally apply the law of the plaintiff's
domicile in right of privacy cases,01 French courts apply French law to
events occurring in France.10 2  As such, where an offending publication
originated in another country, a French court would not give relief except as
to harm occurring in France. 03
C. Italy
Italy protects a right of image under several sections of its Civil Code,
as expanded in recent case law. °4 Foreign citizens have the right to initiate
legal proceedings in Italian courts.'0 5 The right is viewed as a "personality
right," and Italian choice of law would apply the law of the foreign plain-
tiff's domicile.106
D. Argentina
Argentina does not recognize a right of publicity per se, but may pro-
tect similar interests as "highly personal rights," which are derived from a
diverse body of law, including several international human rights treaties
and instruments. 0 7 Generally, Argentina courts would apply Argentine law
to both civil and criminal claims (where the wrong occurred in Argentina).
However, Argentina is moving toward a "most significant contacts" ap
99. C. CIV. ART. 1382 (Fr.).
100. Logeais, supra note 6, at 164.
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 150 (cmts. c and e), 153
(cmts. c and d) (1971); McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11.3[B].
102. Logeais, supra note 5, at 541.
103. Id.
104. Silvio Martucelli, An Up-and-coming Rights-The Right of Publicity: Its Birth in Italy
and its Consideration in the United States, 4 ENT. L. REV. 163, 109-11 (1993); Silvio Martucelli,
The Right of Publicity Under Italian CivilLaw, 18 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 543 (1998).
105. Id. at 114.
106. Id.
107. Cabanellas, supra note 5, at 450.
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proach which might lead to the application of foreign law under appropriate
circumstances.° 8
E. Brazil
Like Argentina, Brazil protects interests similar to the right of public-
ity under several bodies of law, including its constitution, copyright and
neighboring rights laws. 09 Although there does not appear to be any rele-
vant caselaw, the constitutional provisions apply to "foreigners living in"
Brazil" and copyright treaties generally require "national treatment"
whereby a foreign national would receive protection under local copyright
law. Since neighboring rights are sometimes subject to "reciprocity,"' I I it is
not clear the extent to which a foreigner would be entitled to such protection
under a neighboring rights theory in Brazil.
F. Canada
Unlike the U.S., Canada's sources for a right of publicity are in unfair
competition law." 2 Four Canadian provinces have a statutory right of pri-
vacy which, like N.Y. Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51, encompass
commercial appropriation." 3 Ontario has developed a "commercial appro-
priation of personality" tort at common law. 4  Thus, the common law
provinces of Canada seem closest to the U.S.
There has been no case law specifically addressing choice of law in
this area in Canada." 5 Although it is not clear what choice of law rules the
various Canadian courts would apply, if the wrong is viewed as an economic
"tort," it seems likely that they would apply the substantive law of the
108. Id at 462.
109. Deborah Fisch Nigri & Silvia Regina Dain Gandelman, The Right of Publicity in the
Brazilian Legal System 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 469 (1998).
110. CONSTITUIA DA REPU)BLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL [Constitution] art. 5 § X (Braz.).
see also, Nigri & Gandleman, supra note 109, at 474.
111. See STEPHAN M. STEWART & HAMISH SANDISON, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBORING RiGHTs, 224-25, 227 (2d Ed., Butterworth & Co., 1989).
112. Robert G. Howell, Publicity Rights in the Common Law Provinces of Canada, 18 LoY.
L.A. ENT. L.J. 487 (1998).
113. See David Vaver, What's Mine is Not Yours: Commercial Appropriation of Personal-
ity Under the Privacy Acts of British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, 15 U.B.C.L. REV.
241, 247 (1981).
114. Id. at 262.
115. See Howell, supra note 95, at 212-13. That article discusses the recent Canadian Su-
preme Court case, Tolofson v. Jensen [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, which diverged from the older U.K.
approach and said that lex loci delecti should be applied in tort cases but that in international
cases it might apply Canadian law to avoid injustice. Id. at 215.
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province where the infringing conduct took place. Similarly, provinces fol-
lowing a "passing off" approach would, like the U.K., apply their local law
to a claim by a domiciliary of another state (or province) for wrongs occur-
ring in their province.
In this symposium, Professor Robert Howell addresses the law in the
common law provinces of Canada. Quebec is a civil law jurisdiction, which
views the right to image as an element of "privacy" law.1 16 A Quebec court
might follow the French approach and apply its own law to exploitation of
persona in Quebec.
G. Australia
There is no general right of publicity in Australia.' 7 Australian claims
with respect to unauthorized use of a celebrity name or likeness proceed un-
der a "passing off ' theory under either common law or sections 52 and 53 of
the Trade Practices Act. Unlike English cases, however, some relatively re-
cent Australian cases have appeared to relax the "common field of activity"
116. See Howell, supra note 112, at 487-88 n.4; Susan H. Abramovitch, Publicity Exploi-
tation of Celebrities: Protection of a Star's Style in Quebec Civil Law, 32 CAHIERS DE DRoIT
301 (1991). In Aubry v. Editions Vice-Versa, Inc., 78 C.P.R.3d 289 (1998), a photograph of a 17
year old girl taken in public was published in an art magazine, and she sued for damages for in-
fringement of her right of privacy under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. Id
The Canadian Supreme Court affirmed an award of $2,000 in damages even though there was no
harm to her reputation, no commercial use, and minimal evidence as to any damage (she testified
that some of her friends laughed at her). Id. at 313. The Court acknowledged that the freedom of
expression in Quebec includes freedom of artistic expression, but found that the public's interest in
seeing this work of art did not outweigh the girl's interest in her privacy. Id. at 300. This was not
a case of information about a public figure, or an incidental appearance of a person in a photo
taken in a public place, in both of which cases, the freedom of expression would have prevailed.
The Court's discussion also points to a current debate in French law as to "whether the right to
one's image is a separate right of personality or an element of the right to privacy." Id. at 298-99.
In Quebec, the right to one's image is an element of right to privacy under the Quebec Charter, but
it has both an "extrapatrimonial" and a "patrimonial" aspect, meaning a personal and a proprietary
aspect. Id. at 299. As to damages, with regard to the "extrapatrimonial" wrong, "moral prejudice"
(i.e. non-monetary damage) is not presumed, but "may consist simply in the annoyance felt by a
person at becoming a 'celebrity."' Id. at 311. Even the taking of the photograph of a person in a
public place may apparently be recognized as causing such damage. Id. The evidence of "moral"
damage here was minimal, but sufficient to support the damages award. Id at 312. As to the
"patrimonial aspect of invasion of privacy," the Court found that "commercial or promotional ex-
ploitation of an image, even of a private individual can cause the victim material prejudice" (i.e.,
monetary damage). Id. at 313. The girl could have claimed damages measured by what would
have been paid to her as a model. Id. Note that the new Civil Code of Quebec, which was not
applicable in the Aubry case, provides in Art. 36 that the use of a person's name, image, likeness
or voice for a purpose other than the legitimate information of the public is an invasion of privacy.
C. Civ. art. 36 (Que.).
117. See McMullan, supra note 94, at 86-87; S. Ricketson, Character Merchandising in
Australia: Its Benefits and Burdens, 1 INTELL. PROP. J. 191 (1990) (Aust.).
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requirement thereby giving plaintiffs a better chance to succeed on a
"passing off' claim against defendants.' 8 For example, in Pacific Dunlop
Ltd. v. Hogan"9 the court found "passing off' when there was a likelihood
that a substantial number of viewers of an advertisement featuring a
"Crocodile Dundee" type character were misled that there was an approval
of the product by Paul Hogan. Section 53 of the Trade Practices Act has
also been successfully used against unauthorized merchandise featuring
Bruce Springsteen,12 0 Dire Straits,'2' and INXS.122 However, Olivia New-
ton-John was not able to stop an advertisement for makeup that said
"Olivia? No-Maybelline!', 23 Hence, uncertainty remains as to what ex-
tent deception or confusion is required. It appears that Australian courts
would apply Australian law to this kind of claim.
24
Although the Australian courts seem to reject a pure "appropriation of
personality" type of action, in a recent case involving a well-known swim-
mer, the Court of Appeal reversed a lower court decision and granted an in-
junction, noting the plaintiff's potential loss of opportunity to exploit his
commercial advantage, and awarding $15,000 damages when his likeness
was used in an advertisement without his consent. 25 Thus, it is possible that
Australian courts will move toward recognizing a cause of action without a
showing of deception.
H. Japan
Japan recognized a right of privacy in the After the Party case. 126 Fa-
mous Japanese right-wing author Mishima wrote a novel which included a
thinly fictionalized characterization of a real person, Mr. Noguchi, who was
a former foreign minister and Communist Party member. 2 7 The fictional
character, Noguchi, was portrayed as having questionable financial activities
118. See Caenegem, supra note 34, at 454.
119. (1989) 14 I.P.R. 398.
120. Claim abandoned after judge ordered interlocutory relief. See SAMUEL K. MuRUMBA,
COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF PERSONALITY, 124 (Law Book Co. Ltd., 1986).
121. See id
122. See Hutchence (trading as INXS) v. South Sea Bubble Co., Pty. (1986) 6 I.P.R. 544.
123. Olivia Newton-John v. Scholl-Plough (1986) No. NSW G208, 68.
124. See generally Pacific Dunlop Ltd., v. Hogan (1989) 14 I.P.R. 398; Hutchence, 6 I.P.R.
544, Newton-John No. NSW G208.
125. See Talmax Pty. Ltd. v. Telstra Corp. (1996) 36 I.P.R. 46.
126. See Tokyo Dist. Ct., 28 September 1964, 15-9 Ge-Minshu 2317-1370.
127. Id.
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and ties to a red-light district. 2 ' Noguchi sued and won 800,000 Yen in
damages.
129
The right of publicity as distinct from privacy was first recognized in
Japan in Mark Lester v. Tokyo Daichi Film.3o Film footage of English
actor Mark Lester was used in a TV advertisement for Lotte chocolate with-
out his consent along with the phrase in the soundtrack "Mark Lester likes
it, too."'' The court awarded Lester 500,000 Yen for economic loss and an
equal amount for harm to his reputation. In the subsequent Steve
McQueen'32 case, the Tokyo District Court denied judgment for McQueen
because even though footage of his performances were used in an advertise-
ment without his consent, there was no implication that he endorsed the
products. The court seemed to deny a proprietary right of publicity type ap-
proach. Note that in both of these cases, the plaintiff was a non-Japanese
national. Japanese courts apparently apply Japanese law to a claim involv-
ing violation of these rights in Japan.
Even more recently, the Tokyo High Court recognized the right of
publicity as a property right. In the "Oniyanki Club" case, 133 a group of
popular television actors' likenesses were used in a calendar without their
consent. The court reversed the lower court's finding of an infringement of
privacy since there was no showing of harm to the actors' reputation or per-
sonality, but granted an injunction and damages for the economic harm,
saying that, "analogous to property rights, it should be the artists' exclusive
right to be in control of the commercial exploitation of the benefits and value
of their attraction to consumers. Although many questions remain unan-
swered, it appears that the right is considered available only to "famous art-
ists," which may survive the death of such an artist. 135 All of the above
cases were brought under Article 709 of the Japanese Civil Code, which
provides liability for damages for intentional or negligent acts.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Tokyo Dist. Ct., 29 June 1976, 817 Hanrei Jiho 23.
131. See id
132. See 10 November 1980, 981 Hanrei Jiho 19.
133. See Tokyo High Court, 26 September 1991, 1400 Hanrei Jiho 3-14.
134. See Id.
135. See Doi Bansui, Tokyo district Court, 4 June 1992, 788 Hanrei Times 207 (reporting a
claim by heirs of deceased poet against Prefecture's placing of sign outside residence, on basis that
he was not such an "artist").
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VI. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
Several theories have been proposed for why the law should recognize
an exclusive right to control the commercial use of identity. These theories
include natural rights theories and economic theories. There are, however,
countervailing policies surrounding the right of publicity which concern the
negative impact of the right upon free speech.
A. Natural Rights Theories
1. Unjust Enrichment
Professor McCarthy argues that the right of publicity is a natural right
based upon "widely held perceptions of unfair conduct. ' ,13 6 This appears to
be the most commonly asserted judicial theory for recognizing the right of
publicity in the U.S.) 37 However, scholars resist relying on this theory be-
cause it rests on intuition rather than analysis. 13' Even advocates of this ap-
proach recognize there is circularity in calling the use of a persona a
"misappropriation"-it is, only if a court says that it is.'
39
Professor Madow rejects this rationale for several reasons.' 40 First,
there is no requirement of "originality" in the right of publicity. Celebrities
"borrow" from other sources-prior celebrities, their character roles-in
developing their persona. 14' Therefore, it is disingenuous to say that one
who uses a derivative persona has misappropriated it. Second, many com-
mercial activities involve profiting from others' work, and there is a pre-
sumption of permissibility, absent countervailing interests. Third, some un-
authorized appropriators transform what they use by adding expressions of
their own, which is of value to society. 42
Professor McCarthy responds to that critique by arguing that the bur-
den of proof as to the right should be on those who oppose it.143 Professor
Kwall adds that, "[o]ther types of property are subject to individual owner-
136. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 2.1[A].
137. Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT. L.
REv. 97, 109 (1994). But see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n., 95 F.3d
959, 975 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[B]lind appeals to first principles carry no weight in our balancing
analysis.").
138. See McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 2.1[A].
139. Id.
140. See Madow, supra note 22, at 196-205.
141. See Braudy, supra note 26, at 3-4.
142. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Assn., 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th Cir.
1996).
143. See McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 2.1[B].
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ship despite the existence of multiple influences in its creation,"' 44 such as
items of cultural property and trademarks. Furthermore, she argues, all
creators "borrow" and other works derive value and meaning from their
audiences, yet the law recognizes proprietary rights in such works, so why
shouldn't the same apply to celebrity persona?
14
Those counter-arguments are unpersuasive when applied to right of
publicity issues. Arguments as to burden of proof do not advance the
analysis of the issue. Professor Kwall backs off from her own argument in
noting that cultural property should probably be owned by the cultural
group from which it originated. In addition, her analogy to trademarks ig-
nores the basic concept that the agencies whose efforts create secondary
meaning are just that-agents whose acts are attributed to the principal.
This seems easily distinguishable from the prior celebrities, screenwriters,
directors, and others from whom value is taken by celebrities.
The analogy to copyrights also seems misplaced in this connection.
Although both persona and works may be "texts" gaining meaning only
through the perception of the viewer,'4 on a continuum, copyrightable
works have more inherent content than celebrity likenesses. Moreover,
copyrights don't extend to ideas and are only protected if original and em-
bodying at least a modicum of creativity. Ultimately, the unjust enrichment
rationale merely reflects the viewpoint of commentators and judges and does
not seem to provide either a justification for the right or predictive value as
to the outcome of any particular case.
2. Labor Theory
Another proposed natural rights rationale is a Lockean "labor theory,"
which holds that a person is entitled to own the fruits of her labor.' 47 The
labor theory was proposed as a rationale for recognizing a right of publicity
by Professor Nimmer in his seminal article on the subject.1
48
Madow raises numerous counter-arguments to this rationale.' 49 First,
he questions whether a person has a natural right to the full market value of
a product of her labor (thus appropriating not only the "value added," but
144. Kwall, supra note 8, at 44.
145. Id. at45.
146. See generally Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the
Fiction of the Work, 68 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 725, 727 (1993) (discussing modem literary criticism
that sees material as "texts" resulting from the interaction between the "artifact" and the audience).
147. Kwall, supra note 8, at 39; see Justin Hughes, The Philosophy ofIntellectual Property,
77 GEo. L.J. 287 (1988).
148. See Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
149. See Madow, supra note 140, at 181-96.
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that which was removed from the commons).150 Second, he argues that
"[Clelebrities do not create commercially marketable public images in any-
thing like the way carpenters make chairs., 151 Associative value derives
from semiotic power, not labor.'52 Fame is conferred by others, it is largely
the result of chance5 3 and the need of modem media for subjects to attract
viewers. 154 Even in the current world of spin-doctors and carefully con-
structed images, "[T]he media and the public always play a substantial part
in the image-making process. ' 55 Thus, he concludes any moral claim by a
celebrity to her image is unconvincing.
Professor Kwall's response to those arguments is set forth above. Ul-
timately, both she and Professor McCarthy conclude that a celebrity's effort
often merits legal protection. This rationale has some persuasiveness and is
often referred to by U.S. courts that recognize the right. 5 6 Interestingly,
Locke's home country, England, does not seem persuaded, and Lockean
theories seem to have more influence in the U.S. than in the U.K.
3. Personality Theory
A third type of natural rights rationale is a Hegelian "personality the-
ory" of property, whereby property is owned because it is the extension of
the creator's personality. 5 7 It has been suggested that this rationale is par-
ticularly appropriate as applied to the right of publicity, because an individ-
ual's persona is the direct embodiment of her personality.'58 Countries like
France, which view the right of image as a personality right, rely primarily
on this rationale, 5 9 although this approach has not been generally accepted
as the rationale for copyright in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. Critics of the
right of publicity have not attacked it to the extent they have other ration-
ales.
150. Id. at 175 n.239, 183-84.
151. Id. at 184.
152. Id. at 185.
153. See Hughes, supra note 147, at 341 n.220.
Indeed, it is difficult to fit personas into both the labor and personality theories of
intellectual property. They are sometimes the result of hard work toward securing a
public image based on an internal vision. But quite often they are creations of pure
chance, perhaps the only 'intellectual property' without intentionality. Id.
154. Id.
155. Madow, supra note 140, at 193.
156. Cardtoons, L.C., 95 F.3d at 975 (noting that this rationale may be more persuasive as to
athletes, whose "athletic success is fairly straightforwardly the result of an ahtlete's natural talent
and dedication.").
157. Kwall, supra note 8, at 39-40.
158. Hughes, supra note 147, at 329.
159. Logeais, supra note 5, at 513.
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However, although the personality theory rationale supports a personal
right such as the commercial appropriation form of privacy, it does not pro-
vide a rationale for a property type right which is assignable and descendi-
ble-in other words a right of publicity, as understood in U.S. jurispru-
dence.160 Other rights exist to protect injury to feelings. 16' France's reliance
on this rationale explains some of its difficulty in conceiving a proper basis
for the right "on" the image-an assignable, descendible right.
B. Economic Theories
1. Utilitarian/Incentive Theories
Another rationale analogizes the right of publicity to traditional U.S.
copyright policy reflected in the constitutional intellectual property clause,
162
and proposes that creation of celebrity is valuable to society, and economic
incentives are necessary to encourage such creation. 63 The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized this rationale, at least in the context of protection for
an entertainer's performance, 64 and it is a familiar one in U.S. courts.
161
Madow argues that there is no reason to believe that the incentive pro-
vided by the right of publicity is anything but marginal.166 The primary ac-
tivity that generates fame would still be compensated without right of pub-
licity. 167 Individuals who are famous enough to get significant compensation
from a right of publicity are already highly paid, for those primary activi-
ties. 168 Even without the right of publicity, celebrities would be paid for en-
dorsements and for authorizing merchandise. After noting that there is no
evidence that the primary activities would be reduced if there were no right
of publicity, he speculates that rejecting the right of publicity might lead to
more productive primary activities, because celebrities that do not bother
performing on account of merchandising income might be encouraged to
perform more.169 The right of publicity generates more income to those who
160. Cardtoons L.C., 95 F.3d, at 976 ("Publicity rights, however, are meant to protect
against the loss of financial gain, not mental anguish.").
161. Id.
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
163. See McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 2.2; KwalU, supra note 8, at 35; see also, Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
164. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576-77.
165. But see CardtoonsL.C., 95 F.3d, at 973-974.
166. Madow, supra note 140, at 206-16.
167. CardtoonsL.C., 95 F.3d, at 973.
168. Id. at 974.
169. See Madow, supra note 140, at 212.
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need it least-those who are already successful. Finally, there are "uniquely
important noneconomic motivations" for fame.1 70
While acknowledging that the incentive rationale would not apply in
some cases, proponents of the right of publicity counter those arguments by
pointing out that if individuals could not control commercial exploitation of
their persona after it became valuable, they might refrain from doing socially
valuable things for fear of the consequences of fame-the crass exploita-
tion-that might result.17 1 McCarthy also argues that, like in the case of
copyright law, the issue is not whether the existence of the right motivates
any particular work, but that the system of incentives motivates productivity
generally.112 Kwall also argues that there are significant costs to celebrity
status, such as reduced privacy and personal freedom, which are counterbal-
anced in part by the incentives provided through a right of publicity.7
2. Consumer Protection Arguments
Some have argued that the right of publicity protects consumers from
being misled as to the source of goods or the association of persons with
commodities.' 74 This is the basis for "passing off' and related theories.
Madow argues that consumers are not so easily misled 175 and that a right of
publicity precludes even non-misleading advertising. 17 6 Both Madow and
McCarthy ultimately note that a right of publicity is not necessary to protect
against consumer deception because other legal theories are available to
achieve that goal.1 77 In fact, Australian and Canadian law protect interests
similar to the right of publicity through an extended version of the U.K.
"passing off' approach. However, unlike the U.K., Australian and Cana-
dian law recognize, more so than U.K. courts have generally been willing to
do, that there can be an appropriation of associative value even if the plain-
tiff is not trying to sell goods competitive with the defendant's.
170. See Madow, supra note 22, at 214.
171. See McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 2.2; Kwall, supra note 8, at 36-37.
172. See id., § 2.2.
173. See Kwall supra note 8, at 37.
174. See McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 2.4; James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of
Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REv. 637 (1973).
175. See Madow, supra note 140, at 230. Note that the Australian courts in the Hogan cases
also made that observation, but gave relief based on the more subtle associative effects of use of
celebrity persona.
176. Id. at 231-32.
177. CardtoonsL.C., 95 F.3d at 975.
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3. Allocative Economic Theory
Modem neoclassical economic theory asserts that granting exclusive
alienable property rights leads to the most efficient allocation of resources
by facilitating market transactions through which the rights are ultimately
allocated to their highest valued use.1 78 While many scholars and those in-
terests which stand to gain by the existence of vigorous exclusive rights are
enthusiastic about this approach, courts generally are not persuaded by this
approach.79 Madow challenges the "tragedy of the commons" rationale as
it might be applied to celebrity-even if a given celebrity's persona was
used until is was worthless because it was "free," celebrity is not a
"nonrenewable natural resource."' 80 As a social creation, there will always
be a fresh supply of a new and existing personalities to exploit.' 8 '
Moreover, transaction costs preclude optimal allocation. He observes
that, although some scholars favor the approach, no court has ever justified
a right of publicity by reference to this rationale. 182  Finally, celebrities
would not necessarily act to maximize economic value, but rather might act
to "suppress criticism, and thus permanently remove a valuable source of
information about their identity from the marketplace.'
' 83
Madow's broader critique of the economic analysis approach is per-
haps more relevant to the discussion of international rights of publicity. He
notes that economic analysis does not help us evaluate what legal rules a
culture should choose, what should a celebrity's role be in society, and to
what extent a culture's choice of legal rules, such as those involving right of
publicity, contribute to its implementation. 8 4 Are Americans too obsessed
with celebrities? What are the implications for a democratic society? Ma-
dow raises these fascinating broader questions, but does not draw a conclu-
sion, except that, in his opinion, the case for the right of publicity has not
been proved.
Professor Kwall's recent article on "Fame," examined these broader is-
sues and the "[s]ociological and cultural influences that have prompted the
178. See McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 2.3; Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA.
L. REV. 393 (1978); see generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil
Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 306-324 (1996) (discussing the neoclassicist approach to copyright).
179. See Grady, supra note 137, at 106; MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 2.4. But see Card-
toons, L.C., 95 F.3dat 975 (implying this rationale has some persuasiveness as to advertising uses,
but not other commercial or speech uses).
180. Madow, supra note 140, at 224.
181. Id
182. Id. at 225.
183. Cardtoons, L.C., 95 F.3d at 975.
184. Madow, supra note 140, at 225.
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doctrine's initial recognition and increasing application," ' 5 concluding that
"[tihe right of publicity is entirely consistent with our history and the very
essence of our cultural fabric... [f]rom a doctrinal as well as a sociological
perspective, the right of publicity is justifiably treated as a property right in
our society."' 86 Professor Kwall addresses the status of rights of publicity
internationally, and contrasts that with the U.S. and international treatment
of moral rights. In spite of the critics, such as Professor Madow, Kwall pro-
fesses enthusiasm for popular culture and fame, and vigorously defends the
right of publicity as a property right, which suggests that she would support
the implementation of a similarly strong right of publicity, at least in other
modem industrial societies.
C. Countervailing Policies
In addition to the counterarguments to the rationales discussed above,
it is important to consider the potential impact of the right of publicity on
freedom of speech and expression. 187 There are many ways in which a per-
son's likeness may be used implicate speech. Even "commercial speech" is
subject to constitutional protection under U.S. law.'88 As the scope of the
right of publicity expands, U.S. courts are increasingly having to balance
proprietary persona rights as a restriction on speech against constitutionally
recognized speech interests.'" Through a variety of legal mechanisms, the
laws of the countries considered in this symposium also seek to balance
speech interests against persona rights, although not always reaching the
same result as would be reached under U.S. law.' 90 As American scholars
advocate the spread of a broad proprietary right of publicity throughout the
world, it is important to also recognize the importance of limitations on the
185. Kwall, supra note 8, at 2.
186. Id. at 57.
187. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 10, Chapter 8; see also Roberta Rosenthall
Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis,
70 IND. L.J. 47 (1994).
188. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U'S.
557 (1980); Stephen R. Barnett, The Right of Publicity Versus Free Speech in Advertising:
Some Counter-Points to Professor McCarthy, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 593 (1996).
189. See Cardtoons, L.C., 95 F.3d 959; New York Magazine v. Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, 136 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1998).
190. See Jeanne M. Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren & Brandeis
Tort is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris, 68 TuL. L. REv. 1219 (1994). After reviewing
several French cases dealing with docudramas and fictionalized accounts of newsworthy events,
Ms. Hauch states that "EC law's analogue to the First Amendment will be unable to act as a brake
on the powerful engine of French privacy law." Id. at 1286.
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rights which protect fundamental democratic values.' 9' As noted intellectual
property scholar, Professor Sam Ricketson, said in his article considering
the expansion of these rights in Australia:
Public figures and images, whether real or fictional, already
command high respect and influence in our society: compre-
hensive protection for such things may therefore represent too
great an imposition for a free market and a community commit-
ted to free speech to bear. These burdens may become intoler-
able if such protection is extended to names and images in gen-
eral, so as to safeguard the interests of private individuals.
192
VII. CONCLUSION
In concluding this Foreword, a preliminary observation in that connec-
tion bears mention. Like copyright, persona can be an important vehicle of
expression and it can serve as a valuable communicative function in a demo-
cratic civil society. Also like copyright, limitations on the exclusive rights to
persona are extremely important, particularly limitations that support free-
dom of expression and of the press. We are at a moment in history where
intellectual property rights, including the right of publicity, are becoming
currency in the system of world trade, and are, in general, being strength-
ened substantially. In considering whether vigorous copyright protection
should be implemented worldwide, Neil Netanel has recently suggested that
implementation of U.S. style copyright may not necessarily be the best strat-
egy to foster the development and growth of democracy in all societies.
93
Before advocating that other nations recognize a U.S. style property right in
persona, one should similarly consider the expressive component of image
and the specific contours of other societies, paying particular attention to
their implementation of protections for freedom of expression. Considering
various market sectors, local conditions, and policy questions, 194 one might
conclude that a different scheme of protection might better further demcratic
social interests.
191. See Netanel, supra note 5, at 329.
192. See Ricketson, supra note 117, at 208.
193. ee Netanel, supra note 5, at 329.
194. Id.
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